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The paper is divided in three sections presenting some stylized facts concerning
monetary and exchange rate policy framework in Slovenia.  
Three periods are covered: Money-based Stabilization Policy (1991-1995), Price and 
Real Exchange Rate Stability Dual Targeting Policy (1996-2001), and Exchange Rate 
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The monetary policy framework in Slovenia has been modified three times since country’s 
independence in 1991. First, price stabilization was pursued with a framework that relied on 
monetary anchor (1991-1995). After a single digit inflation level was achieved, the stability of 
the currency measured both in terms of prices and the real exchange rate was pursued by 
means of dual targeting of both base money and the exchange rate (1996-2001) although 
formally monetary aggregates were used as intermediate and operating targets. The last 
change in the monetary framework, aiming at addressing the persistence of inflation and the 
EU accession requirements, rests on a framework that uses the exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor for reducing inflation (2001- ). 
Two important considerations have guided policy formulation and implementation since 
independence: the relatively high degree of discretion in conducting monetary policy and the 
cost dimension. Monetary policy targets (M1) were not announced until 1997 and, from then 
onwards, wide target ranges for the new M3 intermediate target were used until recently. The 
last change in the monetary policy framework that took place in 2001 consists of targeting an 
unannounced pre-determined exchange rate depreciation path. Cost minimization of 
implementing monetary policy, what could be called as “fear of paying”, has been a 
permanent and critical consideration even at the expense of suppressing price signals in the 
economy, even at the times when response to shocks would have required movements in the 
interest rates. This is reflected in the use of direct monetary policy instruments (acquiescence 
with collective interbank agreement on interest rates), pervasiveness of capital controls, use of 
indirect policy instruments that target volume of money rather than its price (tap sale of 
securities and volume auction) and recurrent sterilization at negative real interest rates. 
The monetary policy framework has evolved, but remained unbalanced as it basically relies on 
the exchange rate transmission mechanism of monetary policy, while the interest transmission 
channel has remained obstructed. This has hampered the use of interest rates in the defense 
of the exchange rate and to convey monetary policy stance. 
The exchange rate regime, a de jure managed floating since independence, has been de facto 
modified in accordance with the main policy objectives that guided monetary policy in 
different periods (See Figure 1). In the period 1991-1995 the exchange rate path (nominal and 
real) followed the trajectory depicted by the overshooting model of Dornbusch. The 
authorities at that time could not do much to prevent fundamentals-driven exchange rate 




to a de facto passive crawling exchange rate regime in which the monetary authorities aimed at 
closing ex post the domestic-foreign inflation differential, and to curb exchange rate volatility. 
As a result of the policy implemented during the period 1996-2001 the real value of the 
currency measured in terms of the CPI deflated real effective exchange rate remained fairly 
constant but inflation lingered on at a high single digit sticky level. The last change in the 
exchange rate regime took place in order to address the challenges of the prospective 
membership of Slovenia in the EU and simultaneously to tackle the problem of persistence of 
inflation that has become more evident. In 2001 the exchange rate regime shifted to a de facto 
active crawling in which the exchange rate tightly follows an unannounced depreciation path.  
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The design of Slovenia’s monetary policy has been influenced by four important events:  
i) Slovenia’s independence in 1991 and the inherited hyperinflation, which influenced the 
choice of a monetary aggregate as the nominal anchor for price stabilization; ii) an interest 
rate shock in 1995, driven by de-indexation of demand deposits and changes in the 
methodology of calculating indexation of financial contracts, which determined the monetary 
authorities’ complacent attitude to pervasiveness of indexation of financial contracts and their 




1996 and the preemptive capital controls policy from 1995 onwards to reduce the cost of 
implementation of monetary policy; iv) accession negotiations with the EU in the fields of 
monetary and exchange rate policy and prospective EU membership that led to the 
dismantling of capital controls, changes in the central bank law (clearly defining price stability 
as the primary policy objective), an enhancing of transparency and a more decisive stance to 
reduce inflation to EU levels. 
The main question for the future is whether the recently modified policy framework will have 
to be modified once more before joining the ERM2. For example, changing the existing 
regime to one that relies also on monetary policy implementation through the interest rate 
channel, which is less vulnerable to unintended depreciation of the exchange rate. Similarly, 
consideration should be given to shifting to a new regime that would be less discretionary and 
more transparent, in order to anchor inflationary expectations, and that would respond to the 
requirement of preparing the financial sector to the ECB policy operating environment where 
monetary policy is implemented and transmitted primarily through the interest channel and 
not through the exchange rate channel in a pretty much non-indexed environment. A shift in 
the strategy to a de facto compliance with the ERM2 requirements before joining the EU for 
example in line with Hungary could potentially reduce the risks of postponing the entrance to 
the mentioned exchange rate regime and of delaying the adoption of the euro. In any case, 
such a policy change in the monetary policy framework would have to occur at the time of 
joining the ERM2 at the latest.  
The paper is divided in three sections presenting some stylized facts concerning monetary and 
exchange rate policy framework during the three periods. 
 
1  Money-based Stabilization Policy (1991-1995) 
 
Slovenia inherited hyperinflation from the former Yugoslavia. The main policy task after 
independence and the introduction of the new currency (the Tolar) in 1991 was to achieve 
price stabilization. The authorities decided for a money-based stabilization policy. The 
intermediate target was M1, while base money was the operating target. The strategy was 
successful in bringing down inflation to a high single digit level by 1995. Fiscal policy to a 
large extent contributed to such an outcome as the general government budget even 
registered surpluses throughout the period (1992-1996). 
While a de jure  managed floating exchange rate regime has been in place since independence 




changes in the exchange rate regime is the one of a freely falling exchange rate regime during 
the price stabilization period (1991-1995) and then, from 1996 on, that of a crawling 
exchange rate regime (Reinhart and Rogoff 2002). However, it could also be argued, based on 
the fact that exchange rate intervention started already earlier in the second half of 1992 to 
prevent the real exchange rate appreciation (Mencinger 2001), that an early classification of 
the exchange rate regime as a de facto crawling is more suitable. In our view, given the fact that 
the nominal and real exchange rate paths followed the stylized trajectories of the Dornbusch 
(1976) overshooting model during the period of price stabilization (1991-1995) until the 
inflation rate reached the high but sticky single digit level, it seems that the description that 
best fits the exchange rate regime during the period 1991-1995 is the one of freely falling. 
This characterization seems also appropriate given the fact that the monetary authorities 
could not do much to influence the exchange rate trajectory (BoS 1996) as determined by the 
fundamentals and an intensive exchange rate intervention would have been in conflict with 
the stabilization objective pursued by the authorities.  
The operating environment in which monetary policy was implemented during the first half 
of the decade had the dominant features of a closed economy  to capital inflows due to the 
high currency premium and Slovenia’s lack of access to international financial markets. In 
addition, the economy was undergoing a freely falling exchange rate phase required for 
achieving price stabilization under the money-based policy. Monetary developments in this 
period were driven mainly by domestic residents’ regaining confidence in the currency (re-
monetization) and current account developments under a overshooted exchange rate.  
Despite the specific features of an economy in transition and the shock resulting from the 
loss of internal market of the former Yugoslavia, it is possible to argue that the economy 
during the money-based price stabilization period exhibited (Table 3.1), to a large extent, 
features and empirical regularities similar to other money-based programs in chronic inflation 
economies observed by Calvo and Vegh (1999).  
i)  Inflation was reduced sharply after one year. 
ii)  There was an initial increase in domestic real interest rates in 1992. Since they 
were indexed to inflation, rates declined with it in 1993. However, the decline 
slowed down up to 1994, partially offsetting the excess money demand. In 1995, 
changes in indexation led to a faster reduction of interest rates and a 




iii)  The real exchange rate appreciated (particularly in 1995) to correct money-market 
disequilibria which led to increase in the consumption of foreign goods which in 
turn contributed to the current account deterioration in 1995. 
iv)  There was contraction in the economic activity in the first year but it is difficult to 
assess the contribution of the stabilization policy as the economy suffered 
multiple shocks. However, real growth turned positive already in 1993, earlier 
than in other programs.   
v)  Contrary to other programs in which the inflation rate slowly converged to the 
rate of growth of money supply, in Slovenia the reverse happened, which seems 
to reflect strong money demand for transaction purposes. Also contrary to other 
programs, further deterioration of the current account was avoided, and reversed 
at the end of 1995 by a sharp depreciation of the Tolar, triggered by an increase in 
money demand resulting from the elimination of indexation on one-month 
demand deposits and changes in indexation calculation methodology. 
 
Table 1.   Macroeconomic Indicators for the Slovenian Economy (1993-1996) 
   1 9 9 3  1 9 9 4  1 9 9 5  1 9 9 6 
Inflation (annual average %)   32.9  21.0  13.5  9.9 
Base money (average growth %)  80.4  46.8  48.2  13.1 
M1 (average growth %)  86.9  55.8  40.4  25.7 
Basic interest rate (TOM %)  22.4  18.7  8.2  9.7 
REER (CPI, 1995=100)  87.0  90.2  100.0  96.7 
Private consumption (real growth %)  13.9  5.1  9.1  2.0 
Real growth of GDP (%)  1.9  4.9  4.1  3.5 
Exports (real growth %)  2.1  10.0  1.1  3.6 
Imports (real growth %)  13.0  5.9  11.3  2.1 
Current account balance (% GDP)  1.5  4.0  -0.6  0.2 
Memorandum item: real wage growth  13.3  3.6 4.4 4.9 






As said above, the movements of the exchange rate during the period of price stabilization 
followed broadly the characteristics of a freely falling exchange rate regime and the stylized 
trajectories of the Dornbusch overshooting model (See Figure 2)
1. This characterization 
seems the most appropriate for the whole period of stabilization and not only for the first 
two years after independence (Reinhart  and Rogoff 2002).
2  
The arguments in favor of characterizing the exchange regime as a freely falling regime are 
threefold: i) although inflation in Slovenia was above 40% until April 1993, a single digit 
inflation was reached only in the last quarter of 1995; ii) the policy priority was to achieve 
price stabilization (BoS 1996), thus reverting the real appreciation of the exchange rate would 
have undermined the price stabilization process and would have been difficult to implement, 
and; iii) while Slovenia did not experience a currency crisis in the classic sense, the effect of 
introducing a new currency is similar. 
Figure 2.   Exchange Rate Overshooting 
 
As the evidence shows, the exchange rate (nominal and real) followed a overshooting 
trajectory during the stabilization period. The freely falling episode started with the initial 
setting of the nominal exchange rate of the Tolar against the DEM at a rate that implied a 
                                                 
1 This finding seems to challenge for Slovenia the view valid for other transition countries of a no apparent link 
between the evolution of the nominal and real exchange rates at the beginning of the transition (Grafe and 
Wyplosz, 1997). 
2 The freely falling regime characterization of Rogoff and Reinhart (2002) applies to episodes in which twelve-
month inflation is above 40%, or to currency crises marked by a transition from a fixed or quasi-fixed regime to 




16% real devaluation, compared to the December 1989 rate, and then it continued with 
nominal and real exchange rate overshooting trajectories, whereby the exchange rate sought a 
clearing level for the foreign exchange market.
3  
The observed exchange rate trajectory during the period is consistent with the monetary 
authorities’ policy of controlling money supply, a gradual increase of confidence in the 
currency and the existence of relative price rigidity. The perception that the exchange rate 
might have overshot its long run value seems to have occurred in early 1994, when the last 
sharp upward swing of the monthly depreciation rate was observed. Afterwards, the annual 
depreciation rate started falling smoothly. At that time, individuals became willing to hold 
Tolars at any domestic interest rate. The expected exchange rate appreciation (the adjustment 
from the overshooting), combined with tight control of domestic credit, corrected the money 
demand imbalance (the former by raising money demand at any given interest rate, the latter 
by reducing its supply). 
It can be said that a new exchange rate equilibrium was reached in 1995. The growth rate of 
base money, the operating target of BoS, finally reached in 1995 a high single digit, steady-
state growth rate characteristic of a post stabilization period (1996-2002). The increase in 
money demand, as evidenced in the gradual repatriation of foreign currency deposits by 
households  in the period 1992-1995, particularly in 94-95, stabilized as the high growth rates 
of total deposits in the banking system decreased after 1995. The unequivocal sign of the end 
of the overshooting and probably the end of the stabilization period was the first nominal 
appreciation of the Tolar, from March until June in 1995, and the underlying appreciation of 
the real exchange rate.  
Another stylized fact of this period is that the monetary authorities influenced interest rates 
only indirectly, through the declining of inflation anchored in the money-based stabilization 
policy, given the huge volatility of interest rates (e.g. interbank rate
4). An important factor 
explaining interest rate volatility and the lack of direct link between policy intentions and 
interest rates (nominal and real) developments is indexation. Interest rates in the economy 
were tied to the movements of the indexation factor of financial contracts, the so-called basic 
interest rate of the economy (TOM) calculated by BoS. Until 2002 all financial contracts 
denominated in Tolars with maturity beyond 30 days were indexed to TOM, equal to the 
                                                 
3 According to Mencinger (2001) the initial nominal exchange rate was set at a level to match a similar level of 
the real exchange rate of the Yugoslav Dinar in 1988 which enabled partial convertibility and the growth of 
foreign exchange reserves during 1988 and 1999.  
4 Despite this fact, the interbank interest rate remained positive, reflecting less distortion in the money market 




previous monthly inflation rate until June 1995.
 5 Interest rates were either tied to TOM or to 
the exchange rate (annualized BoS’ end of month DEM and EURO exchange rate growth) 
and exhibited enormous volatility. Interest rates, by being tied to past inflation, were always 
positive in real terms, with the exception of a period in 1995 when the methodology of 
estimating TOM changed and when indexation of demand deposits with maturities of less 
than 30 days was abolished. 
The monetary authorities did not influence directly the nominal and real level of interest rates 
in the economy which is explained by BoS monetary target and by a cost minimization policy 
(“fear of paying”). In fact, the interest rate on the central bank bills (CB-bills) used for 
controlling base money (foreign currency bills or bills with warrants indexed to either the 
exchange rate or exchange rate and inflation) when expressed in Tolar nominal terms, was 
negative in average real terms (See Figure 3). 
Figure 3.   BoS Nominal Interest Rates (%) 
 
                                                 
5 The Tolar Indexation Clause (TOM for “temeljna obrestna mera”) is the annual interest rate, calculated by BoS and 
used for preserving the value of financial liabilities and assets in domestic currency. TOM (monthly): since 
August 1995: average of previous 3 months’ inflation (until June 1995 indexation was based on so-called R that 
was equal to the previous month’s inflation rate, from June till August 1995 indexation was based on the average 
of previous 3 months’ inflation); since February 1996: 4 months; since December 1996: 6 months; since May 
1997: 12 months. 
Financial liabilities in domestic currency, with maturity less than 30 days, are not revalued from September 1995. 
Since July 2002 financial liabilities and assets in domestic currency, with maturity less than 1 year, are not 
revalued. Financial liabilities and assets in domestic currency, with maturity exceeding 1 year, are still revalued 




The BoS attracted banks’ demand for CB-bills, particularly foreign-currency denominated 
bills that were the main sterilization instrument during the period, by granting banks access to 
its standing credit facilities and to repo operations using CB-bills as collateral, and by 
requiring their use to meet reserve requirement. Such an approach on the one hand delivered 
lower costs of monetary policy implementation, but on the other hand hindered the 
functioning of the interbank market. Moreover, the central bank also refrained from using 
interest rates to respond to shocks. In particular, the BoS did not raise interest rates to offset 
the shock caused by the above mentioned changes in indexation in 1995. It instead responded 
by imposing capital restrictions and administrative measures from February 1995 onwards as 
a consequence of high sterilization costs in 1994  (Caprirolo and Lavrač 2001). The BoS 
influenced the general level of interest rates only by means of direct instruments. Also in 
1995, in order to reduce high lending rates resulting from aggressive pricing behavior of 
smaller banks to attract deposits, the BoS brokered an interbank agreement capping deposit 
interest rates. Such an agreement lasted until March 1999, when it was formally abolished.   
The lack of interest rate signals in the economy and the obstruction of the interest rate 
channel from the point of view of policy formulation is explained to a large extent by the 
monetary targeting but is primarily due to cost considerations (reliance on CB-bills which 
absorbed liquidity at non-market clearing rates). The interbank agreement on interest rate was 
also an important element in this regard. From the operational environment’s point of view, 
the main impediment was the widespread indexation of financial contracts. 
 
2  Price and Real Exchange Rate Stability Dual Targeting Policy  
(1996-2001) 
 
In 1996 the BoS de facto shifted to a different monetary policy framework, whose primary 
goals were price stability and external equilibrium. This dual intermediate target policy 
framework relied on the control of money growth (first M1, later M3) to achieve price 
stability, and on managing the exchange rate to close the domestic-foreign price differential to 
preserve the stability of the real exchange rate. Capital controls, which were progressively 
introduced since February 1995 to reduce the cost of implementing monetary policy, and in a 





6 The monetary policy framework resembled the one described by Bofinger 
and Wollmershauser (2001) in which the monetary authority would pursue the 
accomplishment of internal equilibrium by influencing interest rates and external equilibrium 
by managing the exchange rate. However, the BoS used monetary aggregates -and not interest 
rates- to preserve the internal equilibrium, while it used exchange rate intervention to 
maintain the external equilibrium. 
The operating targets were base money and the exchange rate (SIT/DEM and then 
SIT/EURO). To control base money, the BoS resorted to sterilization of excess liquidity with 
CB-bills sold on tap. Their interest rates were set administratively on non-market clearing 
levels (for instance, the key 60-day bill rate was negative in real terms since the second half of 
1999 until late 2000). 
Until 1997 the control of base money by means of sterilization was implemented with foreign 
currency bills. Since 1997 sterilization was implemented with Tolar denominated CB-bills  
(non-indexed 60-day bills and indexed to inflation 270-day bills), while foreign currency bills 
were used as collateral in open market operations and for meeting reserve requirements. The 
price of the CB-bills during the period did not reflect the BoS policy stance. Thus, indirect 
instruments withdrew excess liquidity without conveying price signals to the economy. The 
TOM continued to be the reference interest rate in the economy throughout the period. 
The exchange rate was managed as a de facto passive crawling regime, in which exchange rate 
movements aimed at eliminating the domestic-foreign price differential. The correction of 
price divergences took place mostly in the second half of the year (specially during the 1996-
98 period: see Figure 4). Exchange rate intervention was also used to reduce exchange rate 
volatility. During the years 1999-2000 the pattern of depreciation of the exchange rate, 
although still closing the inflation differential, was not the same. It was affected by the shock 
produced by the introduction of the VAT, which triggered an unintended depreciation of the 
exchange rate in 1999, and by the deterioration in terms of trade that led BoS to curb 
depreciation at the end of 1999, displaying a more aggressive exchange rate policy stance to 
correct the current account deficit in 2000. As a consequence, the CPI-deflated real exchange 





                                                 
6 Capital controls were mostly dismantled in 1999 although short-term restrictions on foreign portfolio 




Figure 4.   Exchange Rate Dynamics during Different Regimes (YoY; Jan = 100) 
Foreign exchange intervention at the beginning of 1996 was first implemented by means of 
two cumbersome instruments, the so-called “triple offer” and “purchase’ of foreign exchange 
with the right-to-sell”, and from 1997 onwards by means of a special agreement between BoS 
and commercial banks (”club”), according to which BoS set the parameters for foreign 
currency transactions between banks and their clients. The “club” agreement was modified in 
1999, 2000 and 2001.
7  
Two important features inherited from the earlier stabilization period which obstructed the 
interest channel of monetary policy continued to characterize the operating financial 
environment during the period under consideration here: the indexation of financial contracts 
                                                 
7The terms and conditions of the 1997 agreement, which was amended by an annex to the agreement signed at 
the end of 1999, laid down mutual rights and obligations in the following cases: (1) intervention buying rate, (2) 
intervention selling rate, (3) determining maximum margin between buying and selling rates applied by the 














































to TOM throughout the period and the ceiling on deposit rates of commercial banks until 
1999. In particular, the traumatic experience of the aftermath of the de-indexation of deposits 
with maturities below 30 days in 1995 seems to have deeply influenced monetary authorities’ 
attitude towards a further de-indexation of financial contracts. 
As financial deepening continued, the relationship between the targeted monetary aggregates 
and inflation became unstable. After 1996, average growth rates of different monetary 
aggregates stabilized and appeared not to contribute to further reductions in inflation (See 
Figure 5).  The first clear reaction to this development was the change of intermediate target 
from M1 to M3, although the BoS kept base money as the operational target. 
 
Figure 5.  Monetary Aggregates and Inflation. (please insert original figure with M3) 
 
During the reduction of inflation that culminated with the lowest annual rate in June 1999 
(4.3%), M1 and base money annual growth rates exhibited increasing trends, while M3 annual 
growth rate started to decline only in the second half of 1998. The behavior of M3 was 
influenced by the undergoing change in its composition towards the Tolar component (the 
share of foreign currency in M3 declined from 33.1% in 1996:Q1 to 23.8% in 1999:Q2), and 
by the lower depreciation of the exchange rate during 1997-98. After the VAT shock, the 
annual growth of M3 did not decline further, which can be partly explained by the reversal in 
the composition of M3 towards the foreign currency component.  
                                                                                                                                             
period of two months. The Bank of Slovenia remunerated the banks, signatories of the agreement, for 




The stabilization of the growth rates of monetary aggregates in 1997-99, and the relatively 
little progress in inflation reduction, particularly after 1999, also indicates that further 
reduction in inflation by monetary targeting would have required a substantial additional 
monetary tightening.  
 To enhance credibility in its policy, the BoS started to announce its targets publicly for the 
first time when it changed its intermediate target to M3 in 1997. The target was set in terms 
of a relatively wide range of the last quarter annual growth of M3 for the year. The range was 
8% during 1997-1999, later reduced to 6% in 2000-2002. This relatively wide margin for the 
target provided a satisfactory degree of discretion for the BoS to alternate between the 
objectives of reducing inflation and maintaining external competitiveness.  
Nevertheless, this dual targeting framework instrumented via control of quantity of money 
within a wide range and an unannounced depreciation path of the exchange rate could not 
serve as an anchor to inflationary expectations. The monetary stance was not visible and the 
short-term connection between the monetary aggregates and inflation was not obvious. 
Moreover, the policy stance was to a large extent interpreted as conflicting, particularly 
because the exchange rate accommodated various price disturbances. The main weaknesses 
of the framework, besides the lack of a visible anchor for inflationary expectations required 
for reducing inflation, was the control of base money via CB-bills sold at non-market clearing 
rates. Thus, in the short-term, the CB virtually relied on the exchange rate as the only price-
information-giving instrument. The obstructed interest rate channel of monetary policy 
further aggravated this. Such a framework, even when supplemented with capital controls, 
was highly vulnerable to any unintended currency depreciation driven by foreign currency 
outflows (e.g. loss of confidence in the currency or a current account deficit). This 
vulnerability was latent even if BoS could resort to the “club” bank agreement on foreign 
exchange transactions to curb the depreciation of the exchange rate, because the central bank, 
in the event of a sudden increase in domestic demand for foreign currency or in a crisis of 
confidence in the currency, could only act reactively to reduce depreciation of the exchange 
rate and never proactively. 
However, this dual targeting framework, supported by capital controls, did allow a gradual 
reduction of inflation until mid-1999, just before the VAT introduction. The policy mix, as 
captured by a depreciation of the exchange rate lower than the one required to close the 
domestic-foreign price differential, underlying a positive uncovered interest differential, 




above). In fact, the annual average depreciation rates of the exchange rate in 1997 and 1998 
despite the intervention were the lowest registered so far (below 2.5% annually). 
The importance of the exchange rate in inflation dynamics is further highlighted, when one 
remembers, as said above, that the average annual growth of money aggregates remained 
stable, and that the share of controlled prices in the CPI basket declined significantly from 
22.4% in 1996 to 14.3% in 1999 -albeit their contribution to inflation was the highest in seven 
years
8 (EBRD 2002). 
Capital controls contributed to achieve the relatively constant real exchange rate (using the 
level of 1995 as the basis) and to lower inflation during 1996-1999 by primarily reducing the 
cost of implementing monetary policy. However, it can be argued that similar policy 
outcomes could have been achieved by simply relying on actively targeting the domestic-
foreign price differential (or the uncovered interest differential) in a de facto active crawling 
exchange rate regime, instead of using capital controls extensively which, in fact, is the 
strategy pursued since 2001. This alternative strategy could have been even more suitable 
taking into account that during the mentioned period FDI inflows were low and 
privatizations of large public enterprises have not yet started to occur. 
The best characterization of the exchange rate regime in this period is the one of a de facto 
passive crawling  regime.
9 The BoS did not announce the rate and pattern of the exchange 
rate crawl, which the evidence shows was determined  based on ex-post developments in the 
domestic-foreign inflation differential, which particularly influenced the exchange rate 
movements in the second half of the year. Similar indications of the existence of a passive 
crawling exchange rate regime are the facts that the actual change in the exchange rate was 
below the required change needed to close the inflation differential, particularly in the period 
1996-98, and that a shift to a more proactive policy stance took place in 2000.  
The robustness of this monetary framework was tested when the VAT tax was introduced 
(July 1999). As a consequence of inflationary expectations concerning the eventual price 
impact of the VAT (Table 3.2), aggregate demand increased in the second quarter of the year 
in anticipation of the shock (e.g. the annual real growth rate of consumption was 6%, the 
highest rate so far since 1995), the current account turned into a substantial deficit, while the 
exchange rate depreciated significantly (the annual rate of depreciation jumped above the 
                                                 
8 The share of controlled prices in the CPI basket reached its peak in the whole period in 1995 (22.5%), then 
after it decreased to 20.4%, 17.0%, 14.3% and 13.7% in the years 1996 to 2000 respectively. Available data on 
the contribution of controlled prices to average inflation during the period of declining inflation was 20.4% in 
1997, 16.5% in 1998 and 13.7% in 1999. In the last three years (2000-2002) the contribution was 14.0%, 13.4% 




annual inflation rate, a situation observed only at the end of 1995 and during the stabilization 
process) reverting for the second time the pace of disinflation in the economy (the first time 
occurred in 1995).  
Table 2.   Macroeconomic Indicators for the Slovenian Economy (1998-2000) 
  Real growth rates (%) 
 
Government 
consumption  Exports 
Private 





GDP  CAB $us mil. 
Inflation 
 (yoy %) 
1998:Q1 0.8  -0.6  1.0  12.2 8.2  6.0 -74.9  3.1 
1998:Q2 -2.7  2.1  -0.4  -11.4 -5.3  2.5 -29.6  1.8 
1998:Q3 9.8  3.5  2.5  14.2 7.1  3.3  161.4  0.2 
1998:Q4 -4.2  2.0  -1.2  10.4  4.7  3.4 -52.2  1.4 
1999:Q1 2.1  -5.5  2.4  -3.1 -2.2  2.9 -50.9  1.8 
1999:Q2  7.1  2.3  5.1  21.1  8.9  7.4  -493.7  1.0 
1999:Q3 -6.7  2.0  -3.7  -17.8 -8.3  4.3 18.2  3.5 
1999:Q4 3.0  3.9  2.4  9.3  5.8  5.0  -256.2  1.9 
2000:Q1 1.1  2.2  -0.7  -1.4  1.1  6.3  -169.0  2.6 
2000:Q2 2.8  3.3  2.1  3.6  -4.0  3.6 -89.0  1.7 
Source: Statistic office of Republic of Slovenia. National Accounts, various numbers. Bank of  
Slovenia Monthly bulletin, various issues. 
 
The BoS did not act preemptively to burst inflationary expectations and to dampen the strong 
domestic demand which triggered a sharp depreciation of the Tolar. The BoS could have 
preemptively increased interest rates to offset the depreciation of the currency driven by 
inflationary expectations and the jump of domestic demand in the second quarter of 1999 in 
anticipation of VAT introduction but it did not.
10 In particular, the BoS could have raised the 
interest rates on CB-bills: actually, the key rate of the 60-day CB-bill turned negative in real 
terms in the last quarter of 1999 and remained so until the last quarter of 2000 (Figure 3). The 
BoS also did not increase the interest rates of the rest of its instruments.
11 The resulting high 
depreciation rate in 1999 and the reversion in the declining annual growth rate of M3 also 
point out to the accommodation of the shock (IMF 2001). Even if the BoS had acted 
preemptively to burst inflationary expectations by rising interest rates it is questionable 
whether such a move would have been transmitted by the banking system to the economy, 
                                                                                                                                             
9 Bofinger and Wollmershauser (2001) distinguish between active and passive crawling peg regimes.  
10 The use of interest rates to defend the currency would not have major fiscal implications, as for example those 
mentioned in Lahiri and Vegh (2000) because the government’s debt service is mainly indexed to inflation or 
exchange rate and the government fiscal stance is quite solid in term of both deficit and debt levels. 
Furthermore, defending the currency would have had a positive fiscal effect.  
11 The only rate that increased during 1999 was the 28-day repo rate as a consequence of the strong demand for 




given the indexation and interest ceiling on deposit rates. This highlights once more the 
weakness of the monetary framework, particularly its limited responsiveness to an unintended 
depreciation of the exchange rate. 
The similar developments in 1995 and 1999 indicate that the exchange rate influences prices 
faster than monetary aggregates, and that there is a strong pass-through from exchange rate to 
inflation.
12 Regarding the size of this pass-through in Slovenia, empirical analysis indicates 
that it ranges between 0.8 and 1 (Coricelli, Jazbec and Masten, 2001, estimate the long run or 
equilibrium pass-through effect to be about 1). This high pass-through might be explained by 
the exchange rate being the most visible policy price variable in the economy, the one that 
reflects most clearly current developments and because it is the price that the central bank can 
influence directly and effectively. It clearly indicates that whatever strategy of reduction of 
inflation is to be implemented it has to rely on weakening this strong link by either: i) 
lowering the depreciation rate in the case of the current exchange rate regime, or; ii) allowing 
the exchange rate to float or simply fixing the exchange rate if the exchange rate regime is to 
be changed. In a crawling or floating exchange rate regime it is necessary to develop a strong 
interest rate transmission mechanism of monetary policy to defend the currency in case of 
shocks (primarily domestic driven), to convey policy stance and to influence expectations. 
When evaluating monetary policy during this period, it is also important to assess whether the 
BoS gave more pre-eminence to the domestic or external equilibrium objectives. It is possible 
to argue that BoS gave higher priority to the domestic target, attributing inflation persistence 
at high single digit levels to the inherent vulnerability of the framework to unintended 
depreciation and to the obstructed interest rate transmission channel. However, the 
fundamental question to address is whether, within the limitations of existing framework, the BoS 
could have been more assertive in lowering inflation by reducing the speed of the exchange 
rate crawl if, for example, the existence of a Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect in Slovenia were 
recognized. 
Most empirical studies have acknowledged the existence of a B-S effect in EU candidate 
countries. Empirical research on the presence of B-S effect in Slovenia has been also 
examined in several studies based on time series and panel co-integration techniques. Most of 
them find that relative price developments are related to relative productivity developments. 
                                                                                                                                             
that despite its imperfection, turned to be positive in real terms for the first time since the first quarter of 1998 
and remained positive for almost three quarters in 1999 (later again turning negative until today).       
12 The full pass-through effect is estimated to happen in three quarters. The pass-through effect was uniformly 




The main difference in Slovenia seems to be the period in which the B-S effect is present. 
While some pioneer studies like Rother (2000), using a sample data for 1993-1998, found out 
that productivity differentials explain about 1.5% higher equilibrium inflation in Slovenia than 
in Germany, recent studies based on time series analysis indicate that the effect of the 
productivity differential on the Slovenian-Germany inflation differential over more extensive 
period (1991-2001) is negative (Egert 2002), or lower (1993-2001) 0,7% (Žumer 2002). The 
difference concerns primarily the first half of the nineties, where the structural changes and 
labor market developments that accompanied the transition process make difficult to account 
for any early presence of a B-S effect. However, it seems to intensify e and become evident in 
the period 1995-01, explaining an inflation differential that ranges from 0,8% (Egert 2002, 
ibid.) to 1.4% (Žumer 2002, ibid.) and that it should remain between 1% to 2% in the future, 
given the trends in productivity growth (IMAD 2002). If it is accepted that relative price 
developments are related to relative productivity developments in Slovenia at least in the 
second half of the nineties, it is possible to assess whether the inflation objective or the 
external equilibrium got preeminence, by comparing the depreciation rate differential between 
the B-S consistent exchange rate and the actual exchange rate, on the one hand, and by 
comparing the resulting differential to the actual movement of the CPI deflated REER. It can 
be then shown that even for a 0% B-S effect on inflation differential, the external equilibrium 
objective got preeminence in the year 1996 and 1999-2001 as the REER depreciated in those 
years. This could be the case even for 2002 if a B-S effect on inflation differential of 1% is 
accepted. It is also clear that, with or without B-S effect, the inflation objective got 
preeminence in 1997 and 1998, as the actual depreciation of the exchange rate was lower than 
the one consistent with a large B-S effect. Similarly, the REER seems to have appreciated in 
both years above the real exchange rate consistent with a B-S effect on prices of about 1%, 
particularly in 1997.  
Thus, once the presence of a B-S effect on prices is recognized, at least for the period 1999-2002, it is 
possible to conclude that the central bank could have exercised a more decisive stance 
towards lowering the depreciation rate of the Tolar and thereby lowering inflation. However, 
the central bank’s preferences seems to have shifted towards external equilibrium at the expense of inflation, as 
it reached a rate of 8.9% at the end of 2000. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
the pass-through intensity seems to have moved earlier to the 3 to 5 months. The year 2000 seems to be an 




3  Exchange Rate Based Stabilization Policy and Accession to ERM2  
(2001- ) 
 
Recent changes in the monetary policy framework are deeply rooted in the accession 
negotiation process to the EU. This process already triggered the lifting of most capital 
controls in 1999 (credit operations), leaving restrictions  mainly on short-term inflows 
(portfolio investments with maturity below 6 months), which were removed later, in January 
2002. Similarly, the central bank law had to be amended, particularly with regard to 
strengthening the final objective of the central bank in terms of price stability. The 
negotiation process also resulted in an increase of transparency, required by the need to align 
monetary instruments with those used by the European Central Bank. 
The impact of the accession process has not influenced monetary policy only directly, due to 
Slovenia’s bilateral negotiations with the EU on the subject, but also indirectly, as other 
Central European countries have taken decisive steps to lower inflation in order to join the 
EMU as soon as possible. The sharpening of the policy stances in other candidate countries 
resulted in comparatively lower inflation rates than in Slovenia, particularly at the end of 
2002, which put additional pressure on Slovenian policy makers. 
The central bank decided to change its monetary policy framework in 2001 as a result of the 
frustration with persistent inflation, the changes resulting from EU negotiations and the 
challenges of joining the ERM2, and later the Euro area. The new framework had to address 
simultaneously the operating environment of an open economy, practically for the first time, 
and the requirement of lowering inflation in order to join ERM2 as soon as Slovenia would 
become an EU member.  
In designing the new policy framework, the central bank explicitly recognized the limited 
controllability of M3 and its impact on attaining the final objective of price stability, the 
critical importance of the exchange rate transmission channel, both in terms of inflation and 
external equilibrium, and the negligible significance of the interest rates transmission channel 
(BoS 2001).  
An aspect that deserves particular attention is the interest rate transmission channel. Among 
the reasons explaining its weaknesses, the BoS includes the widespread use of indexation of 
financial contracts, the presence of the interbank agreement on interest rates until the end of 
1999 and the existence of “structural” excess liquidity in the money market. The other 




(sterilization) by means of non-market instruments. The use of these instruments contributes 
to perpetuate excess liquidity and also does not convey the policy stance. In particular, a 270-
day CB-bill was auctioned for the first time only in November 2001, and this instrument 
remains the only one that is currently auctioned. Even here the CB sets in advance the 
volume and the highest interest rate, thus in fact capping interest rates.  
The new policy framework introduced at the beginning of 2002 may be best described as an 
informal system of inflation targeting. The BoS aims at achieving a medium-term inflation 
projection -not a binding inflation target- by relying on the so-called ‘two pillar’ approach, 
similar to the approach employed by the ECB. The first pillar, consistent with BoS previous 
policy emphasis, is control of broad money and its components (M3). The second is a set of 
indicators (external equilibrium and its determinants, wages and controlled prices), which may 
be used to justify deviations from the previously stated and now projected reference values 
for M3 growth.
13  
The weakness of the new framework is that it still provides a high degree of discretion to the 
CB. Moreover, as the broad target range of M3 has been abandoned but not replaced, there is 
no anchor for inflationary expectations. However, given the fact that overall environment resulting 
from the EU accession compels to prioritize the reduction of inflation, and that the central 
bank formally recognized the role of the exchange rate as the main instrumental variable, the 
central bank has changed its policy to a de facto exchange rate based stabilization policy 
(ERBS), in which the exchange rate is the main anchor of monetary policy and the operating 
target.
14 Since the exchange rate tightly follows an unannounced depreciation target path from 
2001 onwards, the de facto passive crawling exchange rate regime in place since 1996 has 
evolved into a de facto active crawling exchange rate system (See Figures 1 and 4). 
The new policy is implemented via a gradual reduction of the depreciation rate of the 
exchange rate. Since 2001 the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market in the 
framework of a modified agreement by which now all banks trade in foreign currency with 
third parties within narrow bands around a base rate set by the central bank.  In exchange, 
banks get unrestricted access to Tolar liquidity based on a seven-day foreign currency swap 
standing facility (i.e., the swap rate is set administratively). One of the main differences in this 
type of intervention compared to the previous period is that now the central bank is 
permanently present in the foreign exchange market. 
                                                 
13 The M3 target set at the beginning of 2001 was overshoot (23.9% well above the 11%-17% band) as well as 
the projection of M3 for 2002 (22.7%, well above, the 12%-18% band). 




The BoS resorted to the use of a short-term foreign currency swap standing facility instead of 
outright transactions in foreign currency because this instrument, in combination with 
prudential regulation (a so-called ‘liquidity ladder’) restricts credit expansion (i.e., restrains 
granting long-term loans on the basis of short-term securities). This option, which on the one 
hand contributes to monetary control, on the other has the drawback of hindering interbank 
activity as banks instead of lending to each other in the interbank market can simply sell 
foreign currency to BoS to obtain Tolar liquidity (interbank rates are still negative in real 
terms since the middle of 1999).  What is even more problematic is the piling up of foreign 
currency on a seven-day swaps (of about 7% of GDP in mid-2002), which creates enormous 
vulnerability in the case of a currency crisis. This is a possible reason for the BoS to offer 
longer maturity swaps (270 days) since the end of 2002.  
Originally the rate of swap or, more properly, the annualized rate of a seven day forward 
contract, was administratively set to give signals regarding the future dynamics on the 
exchange rate and simultaneously contribute to close the domestic-foreign interest rate 
differential. At the time of its introduction in 2001 the forward rate was set at a level 
consistent with the annualized monthly depreciation rate of the exchange rate (4.5%). 
However, since the domestic-foreign inflation differential has remained wide, while interest 
rates have declined in the EU, this has created tensions between the objective of closing the 
interest rate differential -which requires a high depreciation rate- and the objective of 
lowering inflation -which requires a lower depreciation rate. As a consequence, the level of 
the annualized forward rate, that in principle should be the unbiased prediction of the future 
spot rate, has remained unchanged, and so departed from the actual annualized exchange rate 
depreciation, which has declined. 
This difference between the swap rate (forward rate) and the actual depreciation rate of the 
exchange rate has become a de facto tax on all foreign currency transactions, particularly on the 
banking system. While this is appealing from the point of view of lowering the costs of 
monetary policy (or discouraging interest sensitive capital inflows by contributing to close the 
interest differential) on the other hand it has a distortionary effect because, like other taxes, 
the implicit tax, when possible, is transferred to third parties (in this case, clients), either via 
lower deposit rates or via higher lending rates. Additionally, the de-coupling of the 
movements of the forward rate and the effective future spot rate resulting from the actual 
depreciation of the exchange rate means that they provide two conflicting indications of the 




framework that already lacks an explicit anchor for expectations can undermine the very 
objective it pursues, namely lowering inflation. 
Despite the policy changes introduced in 2001, the monetary framework remains unbalanced 
and vulnerable because, it still relies basically on the exchange rate to simultaneously preserve 
internal and external equilibrium. Control of base money by means of sterilizing the liquidity 
created through the swap or forward standing facility is still targeted to ensure low costs of 
monetary policy, instead of conveying interest rates signals that should be transmitted 
throughout a (yet nonexistent) yield curve to the economy, to influence inflation expectations 
and domestic demand. Thus, the monetary framework and the inflation objective are still 
vulnerable to unintended depreciation of the exchange rate, triggered by currency crisis or 
other shocks, which is magnified by the substantial amount of foreign currency accumulated 
in very short term swaps. 
This framework, which has been designed to face the challenges of an open economy 
environment by relying on closing the interest rate differential with the “help” of the implicit 
tax on foreign exchange transactions, can successfully deter interest-sensitive capital inflows, 
and in fact it has done so, by significantly reducing loans from abroad in 2001-02, but it 
cannot cope with non-interest rate sensitive capital inflows, such as FDI. FDI inflows, to a 
large extent due to the relatively slow privatization agenda, have started to pour into the 
economy creating excess liquidity in the banking system that is not sterilized at market 
clearing rates.
15 In fact, a rate of sterilization of monetized foreign exchange inflows of 
around 60% under invariable interest rates since June 2002 (via 60 day and 270 day bills), 
could not once again deter the reverting upward trend of M3 in the last part of 2002. This 
explains why, for the first time a one-off offer of a 360-day bill at ‘acceptable’ market interest 
rates was made available to banks at the end of 2002:  to mop up excess liquidity  that 
otherwise could not have been sterilized at the previous non-market rates. 
A positive and critical development in 2002, that has not yet been properly incorporated in 
the monetary policy, is the fact that from July 2002 onwards financial instruments with 
maturity of less than one year are not indexed anymore. This important development 
happened as a result of changes in the accounting standards concerning revalorization of 
capital. The event is of outmost importance because it had added enormous transparency to 
the financial system and to its products, at least to those with maturity up to one year. This 
unintended change, the lifting of the veil, has started to unclog the interest rate transmission 
                                                 
15 Given the impact of FDI inflows on monetary conditions there have been some views favoring postponing 




channel of monetary policy, with potential positive beneficial effects for conducting monetary 
policy and adding resiliency to any monetary policy framework.  
In fact, the key central bank interest rate on 60-day bills, that was negative for the most part 
of 2000 and for the first quarter of 2002, turned gradually to positive by June 2002 and 
started to unexpectedly influence other short-term rates. In view of the importance of this 
policy development, monetary authorities should actively pursue de-indexation of instruments 
with maturity longer than one year, to continue building a interest rate transmission channel 
and to dispel persistent inflationary expectations. A well functioning interest rate transmission 
channel would enhance transparency and the resiliency of the monetary policy framework. 
Similarly, the overdue de-indexation of financial contracts would contribute to prepare 
financial institutions to the EU environment in which inflation risk is not fully hedged and 
where monetary policy is transmitted primarily through interest rates.  
While it is still premature to make an assessment concerning the effectiveness of the new 
exchange rate stabilization policy in terms of reducing inflation, it can be said that the trend 
of reducing inflation observed in 2002, despite of shocks produced by changes in tax rates 
and increases in controlled prices, is clearly consistent with the declining depreciation path 
observed before the shocks in 1995 and 1999. This framework should lead to a similar 
reduction in inflation in the near future, even with higher-than-average increases in 
administered prices than the ones observed in 2002 (such as those experienced in 1997-98, 
which accompanied the reduction in inflation until 1999: see Table 3.3). For such an outcome 
three considerations are important: i) the rate of exchange rate depreciation should reach 
similar and sustained lower levels as in 1997-98, which were lower than those observed in 
2002; ii) the monetary authority should resist the temptation to accommodate shocks via 
exchange rate and; iii) the monetary authority should proceed with de-indexation of financial 
contracts and stand ready to use interest rates to offset currency shocks in order not to repeat 










Table 3.   Contribution of Controlled Prices to Inflation in Percent (1997-2002) 
    Contribution of controlled prices to inflation (%) 
  




Institute of Macroeconomic 
 Analysis (IMAD) 
1997 9,4  20,4  20,4 
1998 6,5  16,5  16,5 
1999 8,0  13,7  13,7 
2000 8,9  14,0  14,0 
2001 7,0  12,2  13,4 
2002 7,2  11,8  13,0 
Source: Information from the Ministry of Economy and IMAD estimates. 
Could the inflation in 2002 have been lower than it actually was? The answer can be 
affirmative, given the current account surplus of 2002, which indicates a higher than 
necessary depreciation of the exchange rate. Since the rate of the crawling is not announced, 
this could have been implemented by reducing the currency depreciation rate. As to the issue 
of how and with what effects, the options were two: to reduce the depreciation path either 
slightly or considerably (e.g., via a discrete change in the path). The policy choice would 
probably have different impacts on the inflation rate and on the evolution of the real 
exchange rate. In view of evidence which suggests that the intensity of the pass-through has 
accelerated in time during the last two years (three to five months), it is likely that a 
considerable reduction in the rate of depreciation rather than the alternative could have larger 
immediate effects on lowering inflation, and would have also signaled a more decisive stance 
towards reduction of inflation, therefore enhancing credibility. 
The impact of the alternative scenarios on the real exchange rate is more difficult to discern. 
Taking into account the empirical evidence of a high pass-through in both cases, the effect 
should lead to the same appreciation of the real exchange rate but with different dynamics. 
Nevertheless, a critical factor influencing the outcome is credibility. In absence of an 
announced rate of the crawling and of another anchor for expectations, the only way to 
establish credibility in the policy is by a credible reduction of the depreciation rate, but even 
in this case it may not be easy. From this perspective the eventual real appreciation of the 
exchange rate typically observed in exchange rate-based stabilization programs should be 
lower under a sharp reduction of the speed of exchange rate depreciation than in the case of a 




discretion. From this point of view, the current policy based on a gradual reduction of the 
unannounced rate of crawling can be interpreted as temporary and reversible and can, as 
such, perpetuate inflation inertia. 
Another important issue to address is whether the Slovenian economy, given the persistence 
of a high single digit inflation level and a central bank following a de facto ERBS, would 
experience the short term expansionary effects of other exchange-rate based stabilization 
programs (Fisher, Sahay and Vegh (2002), Calvo and Vegh (1999). The discussion is not only 
relevant in terms of the potential danger inherent to such programs -given the fact that 
ERM2 provides a default exit if things go wrong: namely, joining ERM2 instead of accepting 
a reversal in inflation- but particularly in terms of the expected developments in some key 
variables, particularly inflation. 
A key issue in this regard is the timing of joining ERM2 and the speed at which inflation will 
be brought down to an “acceptable” level. This issue is particularly relevant taking into 
account possible delays in joining ERM2, based on arguments such as that a given rate of 
inflation has not been reached yet or that the level of inflation achieved is not stable yet. 
Despite the effectiveness of ERBS in bringing down inflation, empirical evidence has been 
found that the inflation rate does not converge to the rate of depreciation. This behavior is explained by 
the fact that inflation in tradable goods’ sector slows at much faster rate than in the non-
tradable goods’ sector, explained among other, by inflation inertia build in expectations and 
the productivity differential between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. Thus, the very 
exchange rate strategy chosen by the BoS, compared with other EU candidate countries 
central banks’ strategies, implies that the inflation rate in Slovenia would remain higher than 
in other candidate countries. Therefore, a relatively higher inflation (or a lower speed of 
inflation convergence) in view of the timeframe for accession should not be used as an excuse 
to delay entrance in ERM2, thus endangering the achievement of the major macroeconomic 
strategic goal of joining EMU as soon as possible. This consideration is even more relevant 
taking into account the behavior of inflation differentials in existing EU member countries 
before and after joining the EMU, and taking into account that Slovenia has achieved a 
similar degree of real convergence as some of the existing EU members. In fact, existing 
EMU countries reduced sharply the inflation rates before complying with the Maastricht 
requirement (1996), while afterwards the inflation rates diverged again (1998). 
Given the fact that the chosen ERBS strategy in Slovenia, compared to other strategies 
followed in Central Europe, will deliver a slower pace of disinflation, it is also important for 




control administered prices, since such an approach can eventually undo the very objective of 
the policy. It could hinder confidence, as it can be rightly anticipated that at certain point in 
time prices under control would have to catch up with their normal dynamics, while in the 
mean time they would create losses, increase public sector debt and create fiscal risks. 
Given the lack of explicit monetary policy anchor, probably a formal commitment to an early 
entrance to ERM2 immediately after joining EU would serve as a monetary anchor, as the 
monetary authorities would have to abide to the date of entrance. This strategy requires a 
direct involvement of the government in setting the ERM2 entry date to be a binding target for 
the central bank, to enhance credibility. Alternatively, the monetary authorities could speed 
up the reduction in inflation by changing the exchange rate regime as some other Central 
European accession countries have done, particularly given the historically supportive fiscal 
stance in Slovenia, with the collateral advantage of enabling an early entrance to the Euro 
area, if a de facto compliance with the ERM2 is recognized by the EU as formally satisfying 




This chapter identified three monetary and exchange rate policy regimes in Slovenia since 
independence in 1991: money based stabilization policy (1991-95), price and real exchange 
rate stability dual targeting policy (1996-01), and exchange rate based stabilization policy and 
accession to ERM2 (2001- ). The exchange rate regime, a de jure managed floating since 
independence, has been de facto modified in accordance with the main policy objectives that 
guided monetary policy in different periods. In the 1991-95 period the exchange rate regime 
can be characterized as freely falling regime in which the exchange rate (nominal and real) 
followed the path depicted by the overshooting model of Dornbusch. In 1996, after single 
digit inflation was reached, the exchange rate regime shifted to a de facto passive crawling 
exchange rate regime. The last change in 2001 to a de facto active crawling exchange rate 
regime took place in order to simultaneously address the challenges of the impending 
membership of Slovenia in the EU and to tackle the problem of inflation persistence. 
The main characteristic of the implementation of monetary policy throughout the three 
different periods, which was termed “fear of paying”, is the preference of the monetary 
authorities to use non-market arrangements for pricing monetary policy instruments, 
including capital controls, in order to minimize costs of implementing monetary policy. This has resulted 




of monetary policy still remains blocked. In particular, the lack of use of interest rates to 
defend the currency in 1995 and 1999 resulted in reversals of the disinflation trends that 
preceded both shocks.  
Given the critical importance of joining the Euro area as soon as possible, the monetary 
authorities should pursue further de-indexation of the financial contracts and stand ready to 
use interest rates to defend the currency, insuring that the inflation reduction trend would not 
revert once more. An early entrance to the EMU, in addition to the advantages brought by a 
single currency, will result in an enhanced and transparent monetary policy framework, able 
to cope with the challenges of a small open economy, which will eventually contribute to 
eliminating existing distortions when facing an open financial market.  
Shifting to a balanced conduct of monetary policy that also relies on the interest rate channel 
in a de-indexed economy environment would contribute to prepare the financial sector to the 
ECB policy-operating environment, where monetary policy is implemented and transmitted 
primarily through the interest rates, and not through the exchange rate. In addition, a de-
indexed environment will also contribute to financial institutions’ learning to manage inflation 
risk. Also, the announcement of a self imposed target entry date to ERM2 at the earliest 
possible date by the government could serve as the missing anchor for monetary policy. 
In view of the strategy chosen, the authorities should be aware of the trade-off between the 
speed of convergence of inflation and an early joining the ERM2. Also, the experience of 
existing EU members with respect of inflation developments before and after Euro area entry 
should be taken into account. From this perspective, authorities should resist the temptation 
of introducing additional anchors to the unannounced exchange rate crawling (i.e. restrain 
controlled price increases), because they would result in accumulation of debt and fiscal risk 
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